I. Introduction
For those following debates on the merits of the investment chapters within the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the answer to the titular question is obvious. Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is undoubtedly a mechanism to resolve 'public law' disputes. This is a major reason why many, from the EU to the UN's Independent
Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, want to replace ISDS with an international investment court, 1 and also why U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren was able to find one hundred U.S. law professors to sign a public letter in support of the view that ISDS is such a wrongheaded attempt to 'privatize' what should stay in the 'public' domain that it violates the rule of law. 2 The public nature of the international investment regime, including ISDS, is taken for granted, particularly since there is no doubt that investor-state arbitrators apply public international law and that the international investment regime shares numerous points of intersection with other public international law  Herbert and Rose Rubin Professor of International Law, New York University School of Law. Email: jose.alvarez@nyu.edu. The author is grateful to the participants at a forum at the Graduate Institute in Geneva and to Neha Jain for comments on an earlier draft as well as the Belle S. and Irving E. Meller Fund for International Law at NYU for financial support. 1 See e.g., Aline Robert, 'Parliament Backs TTIP, Rejects ISDS' (Euroactive, 9 July 2015) <www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/european-parliament-backs-ttip-rejects-isds-316142>; UNGA, 'Report of the Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, Alfred-Maurice de Zayas' (14 July 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/30/44 (de Zayas Report). In this report, Mr de Zayas argues that conflicting investment agreements or arbitral awards: are incompatible with international ordre public and invalid as contra bonos mores (de Zayas Report, summary 1); constitute a "corporate move against the fundamentals of state sovereignty" (de Zayas Report, para 27); are akin to an effort to "create a new legal order beyond the Charter of the United Nations" or a "legibus solutus . . . exempt from the rule of law, general principles of law and basic codes of conduct" (de Zayas Report, para 56); that "anti-democratic" ISDS can be and should be terminated and replaced by either national courts or a special international investment court (de Zayas Report, paras 41 and 62), and that in the meantime state victims of "contra bonos mores investor-state dispute settlement should . . . jointly refuse implementation" of the underlying agreements (de Zayas Report, para 62). This report also includes an extensive bibliography of the abundant literature criticizing ISDS from the academy, practitioners, and NGOs (de Zayas Report, [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] regimes. 3 This essay critically examines the consensus that ISDS is 'public' and what is commonly meant by that characterization. It concludes that, for purposes of description and prescription, ISDS, and the regime of which it is a part, should best be seen as a hybrid between public and private.
II. The Top Ten Descriptive Claims
If one uses as a guide Anthea Roberts's enumeration of the "clash of paradigms" that bedevils scholarly debates about the nature of ISDS and competing lines of investor-state arbitral caselaw, it is possible to tease out ten reasons why ISDS, notwithstanding its reliance on the procedural rules and enforcement mechanisms developed in the context of private commercial arbitration, is a system of 'public law'. 4 The elements of what Roberts calls the "public law paradigm" in investment law include the following. ISDS or the international investment regime is public:
1. Because it is based on a regulatory relationship between states as governors and foreign investors as the governed. 5
2. Because it is not about mere contractual disputes between private parties but governmental decisions that involve the public interest, such as whether Mexico can refuse construction of a hazardous waste disposal plant without paying compensation to a foreign investor who believed he had permission to build such a plant. 6 3. Because the regime is a creature of public international law, namely primary rules generated by over 3400 treaties that are governed by the secondary rules of public international law, such as the customary rules of treaty interpretation and the Articles of State Responsibility. 7
4. Because investor-state arbitrators effectively engage in forms of review over public national law that resemble in form and outcome the quintessentially public constitutional or 'judicial review' undertaken by supreme courts around the world. 8 5. Because ISDS does not simply settle discrete commercial disputes; it generates a form of 'global governance' or, as certain NYU-based scholars would put it, 'global administrative law' (GAL)
that de facto regulates states. 9
6. Because the structure of investor-state claims-suits by individual claimants directed against state action based on rights proclaimed in treaties-closely resembles other public international legal regimes, namely regional and global mechanisms to protect human rights. 10 7. Because what ISDS arbitrators typically do-strike a 'balance' between the economic and noneconomic interests of states-resembles what another public international law regime, the trade regime, does. 11
8. Because-despite bilateral appearances-the structure, contents, and remedies provided under international investment protection agreements are not those of tit-for-tat reciprocal deals. The regime produces multilateral effects comparable to those generated by formally multilateral regimes; it aspires to create common rights of public international law. 12 9. Because ISDS arbitrators are disproportionately members of Oscar Schachter's 'invisible college' who share a common outlook and expertise; that is, because its arbitrators are public international lawyers. 13 10. Because ISDS generates and relies on public caselaw, thereby engendering expectations for jurisprudence constante, unlike the private awards usually generated under commercial arbitration. 14 These reasons for ascribing the public label to ISDS are often accompanied by ten reasons why this matters normatively. The ten descriptions above are commonly accompanied by some or all of the ten prescriptions below.
III. The Top Ten Public Prescriptions
1. The public law nature of the regime means that public law analogies are appropriate for filling gaps or resolving interpretative ambiguities in investment law. 15 "democratic and equitable international order" rests on the view that its arbitrators "act as if they were above the international human rights regime" even though they are "not natural guardians of the public interest." de Zayas Report (n 2) para 15. 11 Roberts, 'Clash of Paradigms' (n 4) 69-74. This helps to explain the common tendency, often praised, to draw from WTO law in the interpretation of investment law. See e.g., Valentina Vadi, Analogies in International Investment Law and Arbitration (CUP 2016) at 209-217. 12 Roberts, 'Clash of Paradigms' (n 4) 52-53 (citing to Stephen Schill's The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (CUP 2009)). 13 ibid 54-55 (discussing the role of distinct epistemic communities of lawyers involved). 14 ibid 53 and 62. 15 ibid 47 and 66. Roberts argues that ISDS arbitrators face distinct choices among analogies based on seeing investment law as a subfield within public international law, as a species of international arbitration, or as a form of internationalized judicial review. ibid 47 (also noting that the choice among analogies can determine, for example, whether a losing party should pay its own costs in investor-state arbitration, as suggested by one arbitrator's view in Thunderbird that since states defray their own costs under the European Convention of Human Rights, that should be the solution under the NAFTA as well). For a slightly different formulation of the competing 'paradigms', see Vadi (n 11) 179-182. 2. The public law paradigm reflects and reaffirms the core understanding that states continue to 'own' the treaty regime that they have established. It justifies interpretations of the law that, in case of doubt, side with maintaining the control of the state 'principals' of this regime, including over their arbitrator 'agents'. 16 This view, consistent with seeing ISDS as simply an application of diplomatic espousal, also suggests that states retain the power to waive or settle their nationals' investment claims at any time, take countermeasures, or reach for state-to-state arbitration in lieu of ISDS. 17 3. The public nature of the regime has clear implications for desirable public law reforms for ISDS going forward. 18 These include prescriptions endorsed by GAL or 'public law' scholars, as well as by self-identified 'progressive' NGOs such as the Canadian-based Institute for Sustainable Development. The public law agenda for reform includes greater transparency, amicus participation, processes for review of initial arbitral awards, heightened reason-giving, and increased resort to 'proportionality balancing' to better respect sovereign policy space. 19 As noted, diehard public law enthusiasts urge replacing ISDS with a fully judicialized mechanism (such as an international investment court) to avoid outsourcing to private parties the resolution of public disputes.
4. Investor-state arbitrators should adopt techniques for avoiding judicial law-making. These include adoption of the so-called 'passive virtues' favoring restraint, such as narrow conceptions of standing or ripeness. This prescription would encourage the dismissal of investor claims by, for example, strict interpretations of any pre-conditions imposed on the bringing of investment claims and narrow conceptions of 'covered investment' or 'investment disputes'. It may also suggest that it is appropriate to take a narrow view of permissible remedies often sought by investor claimants, such as arbitral orders for interim measures.
5. Since the public law paradigm "depends on ongoing interactions between treaty parties (as lawgivers) and tribunals (as law-appliers)," 20 changes to international investment agreements (IIAs) and practice need to encourage such interactions. The publicness of the regime suggests the need to maintain a sovereign 'check' on arbitral discretion by, for example, including mechanisms in investment treaties that enable state-issued binding understandings to trump the views of ISDS 16 ibid 59-61. For the view that the most effective supranational forms of adjudication operationalize a principalagent function between state principals and their adjudicator agents, see Eric Posner and John Yoo, 'A Theory of International Adjudication ' (2005) 93 California Law Review 1. 17 See generally Roberts, 'Clash of Paradigms' (n 4) 64 and 70-74 (discussing whether investor claimants are accorded their own independent rights). 18 ibid 63-68. 19 arbitrators (even if these affect the merits of pending investor claims). 21 The need to encourage or enhance state-ISDS interactions may suggest greater roles for national courts, perhaps by insistence on exhaustion of local remedies prior to resort to ISDS and/or enhanced judicial review over the enforcement of arbitral awards. The next generation of international investment treaties, in short, needs to remain acutely sensitive to the desires of states, just as the evolving interpretations of treaties need to remain responsive to the subsequent practice of their state parties.
6. The public law paradigm suggests that investor-state arbitrators should emphasize standards of review that are deferential to sovereigns. 22 Public law proponents differ on how this ought to be done. For some it means displacing, within ISDS, the concept of equality of arms, a 'private law' notion used in commercial arbitration that wrongly assumes that the two litigating parties are subject to equal treatment, with more appropriate 'public law' principles such as in dubio mitius, the margin of appreciation, and subsidiarity. 23 7. Because ISDS is not reducible to mere 'dispute settlement' but is a form of public adjudication that needs to remain attentive to the broader implications of decisions that affect the rights of the community of states (and not just the particular litigants) going forward, it needs to be an agent for the de-fragmentation of public international law. Investor-state arbitrators should take seriously the fact that the investment regime is not a self-contained public law regime. 24 For some this means a particularly fulsome application of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) to permit, for example, recourse to even 'soft' human rights norms when interpreting international investment agreements. 25 Seeing the investment regime as a public regime means that, wherever possible, investor-state arbitrators should borrow the law of other public international law regimes such as those dealing with human rights or trade. 26 8. Adopting a public law frame means accepting ISDS as a caselaw /precedent driven enterprise that is attentive to comparable public law rulings issued by other national and international courts, particularly the ICJ, but also those rendered by the European Court of Human Rights and the 21 ibid at 82-83 (discussing a number of methods to shift power away from the arbitrators and back to states). 22 WTO Appellate Body. 27 Investor-state arbitrators should embrace their juris-generative responsibilities and respect relevant precedents; they should not behave as if they are mere settlers of disputes, one case at a time.
9. The public law paradigm suggests the relevance of (and the priority to be given to) principles initially deployed by national constitutional courts, particularly the principle of proportionality.
This core 'general principle of law' should be imported from the practice of national and international courts to ISDS as it is needed to strike the appropriate balance between regulatory autonomy (or the protection of public policy goals) and investors' rights. 28 10. Adopting a public law frame means that it is presumptively proper to reach for other public law principles developed under national law. It is desirable, for example, to adopt solutions on the basis of a comparative law survey of public administrative laws or "general principles of public law". 29 The descriptive and prescriptive lists above reflect widely accepted views within the academy and international civil society. Most believe: that commercial and investor state arbitration are two clearly distinguishable 'species' of adjudication; 30 that while commercial arbitration is an alternative form of dispute resolution that is attractive to private parties, ISDS, especially when it emerges from a state's advance treaty commitment, is a unique form of privity-less adjudication triggering unique concerns; 31 and that a bumper crop of normative prescriptions follow from these public/private distinctions. It is also widely accepted that the failure to recognize the links between the two lists-that is, the contrary insistence that ISDS is either private or some kind of unique 'hybrid'-makes the investment regime 27 See Roberts 'Clash of Paradigms' (n 4) 62. 28 To Roberts, the contrasting public/private paradigms can be illustrated by the difference between giving due consideration to the legitimate expectations of both investors and states (which may be part of proportionality balancing) versus the application of private law principles like promissory estoppel. ibid. 66 (contrasting the ruling in Tecmed that took into account the expectations of the particular foreign investor (promissory estoppel) versus Saluka, whose more public law approach was illustrated in its conclusion that "no investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is made remain totally unchanged"). vulnerable to continued legitimacy challenges. 32 A principal goal of the ample 'public law' literature is precisely to make sure that ISDS becomes more responsive to 'public rule of law' values. 33 This essay does not attempt to answer current debates about the best ways to reform ISDS. Nor does it address whether it should be replaced by an international investment court. It assumes that irrespective of the outcome of the TTIP negotiations, ISDS will continue to be a fixture within the broader investment regime and that its 'nature' will remain a live issue. 34 The essay concludes that it is difficult to find a jurisprudentially consistent basis for treating commercial arbitration and ISDS as two distinct 'species' of arbitration in part because the public/private divide is itself a construct that is in tension with reality. ISDS continues to share a number of connections with commercial arbitration (not all of them merely 'procedural'), as it does with public international law regimes. To the extent 'public' and 'private' remain useful analytical or descriptive categories, ISDS has both private and public features and, therefore, is most properly described as a hybrid.
The argument here is not that ISDS has no public law features. As is suggested by the first list of descriptive claims above, ISDS shares many features with other public law regimes. It is a creature of public international law and its arbitrators generally apply public international law sources. But, as a hybrid, ISDS is ill-suited to the stark public/private dichotomy that leads some public law advocates to defend the ten highly misleading, often contradictory, or outright erroneous prescriptions in the second list above.
IV. What's Right about the Ten Descriptive Claims
It is obviously true that ISDS invariably involves a government as the respondent whereas international commercial arbitration only sometimes does, that ISDS claims often implicate regulatory issues of wide public interest while commercial arbitrations only rarely do, and that some investor-state awards may have greater effects on the public fisc than do some commercial arbitration awards. 35 specific instances of ISDS-caused 'regulatory chill' remain anecdotal, it is also true that some investor-state rulings entail prescriptive or regulatory consequences for losing respondent states. Those who see ISDS as a tool for GAL governance comparable to, for example, the World Bank Group's various Good Governance and Rule of Law indices, are not wrong. Indeed, there is a strong case to be made that some ISDS rulings and these indices share a common ideology and point states in the same market-friendly direction. 36 It is also true that certain key paragraphs within ISDS rulings, such as those purporting to distill the elements of fair and equitable treatment (FET), are cited with the same frequency (and perhaps wrong-headed reverence) as other common nostrums urged upon states in order to enhance the rule of law. 37 Constitutional scholars are not wrong to see some ISDS disputes as emulating the form and impact of constitutional adjudication. 38 In the language of a recent law review article (not addressing arbitration)
by Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, investment arbitration might be seen as enforcing "law for states" no less than other forms of public law that Goldsmith and Levinson address, namely constitutional law and general public international law. 39 There is also no doubt that ISDS has generated a legitimacy debate all its own. Resort to commercial arbitration has not generated comparable pressures for greater transparency, the admissibility Commercial arbitration has not generated comparable opprobrium given prospects for forum-shopping. 40 As is further discussed below, the different reactions prompted by the two forms of arbitration stem from the relative absence of publicly available commercial arbitral awards. With some exceptions (such as sports law arbitrators), those who arbitrate commercial disputes focus on settling the dispute before them; they pay less attention to prior arbitral awards in large part because there are fewer such ' awards to refer to. The lack of transparency of much commercial arbitral 'caselaw' makes any effort to engage in or produce jurisprudence constante unlikely. By contrast, Stephan Schill is probably correct that the combination of forum-shopping, consequences of MFN guarantees, and reliance on arbitral precedent tends to produce a de facto multilateral investment regime of some kind, and not simply bric-a-brac rulings applying disparate treaties. 41
V.
But is ISDS really a public breed apart?
The accuracy of the first list of ten above rests on contentions that ISDS or its arbitrators are a bit more likely to be X than are commercial arbitrators. The relative publicness of ISDS as compared to commercial arbitration does not support the general conclusion that the former is a distinct and wholly public regime. Those who claim that investment arbitration is distinguishably 'public' have not offered a consistent rationale for the distinction, even though such a rationale appears crucial to the ten public law prescriptions that allegedly follow from it.
Some suggest that the publicness of ISDS rests on the fact that a state is on one side of the 'v' in the heading of a dispute. But just because a state is a respondent does not mean that it is a 'governor' and the claimant is the 'governed' for purposes of an arbitration. Sometimes they are exactly what the 'v' implies: two parties to a contract or some other kind of promise. The suggestion that whenever a state is one of the disputants in arbitration, the dispute (and resulting award) is 'public', while easy to apply, does not serve to credibly distinguish the two ostensible 'species' of arbitration. This would turn any 'commercial' arbitral claim (say between an oil supplier and a state oil company) into a 'public' dispute.
Although in both cases a private party is forcing a sovereign to litigate a dispute outside its own courts, why exactly does resort to international arbitration against a state, whether based on consent given in advance in a contract or a BIT, turn such disputes into 'public' litigation? Is it really the case that a dispute over a breach of contract by a state utility company is a form of 'public' adjudication? If it is, we should be worrying much more about how those non-BIT/FTA claims are being handled or settled and by whom. If the distinction is about the ostensible lack of privity (as Paulsson would put it) 42 under a BIT, why is the consent offered by a state in a BIT not sufficient for 'privity' and, if so, why are we fetishizing about that? There would not appear to be a jurisprudentially relevant difference between a contractual dispute and one based on a treaty when, as is sometimes the case, both emerge from a state's alleged breach of a contractual or comparable state promise (as in a license).
The fact that investor-state disputes alleging breach of contractual or comparable state promises are not conceptually distinct from typical commercial arbitration disputes between two private parties is important. As is suggested by the fact that many of the highly charged ISDS claims against Argentina over the past decade stemmed from investor complaints that Argentina had violated specific promises made to them (as in licenses issued to foreign gas companies), 43 Some of those who adhere to the public/private arbitral divide may be confusing resemblance with equivalence. That ISDS sometimes resembles or has the effects of 'judicial review' does not mean that it is constitutional review. Given how difficult it may be to secure effective compliance with an ICSID ruling, it seems a bit of a stretch to build an entire 'public law' frame on the premise that ad hoc arbitral tribunals, established to resolve a single dispute subject to no stare decisis effect, are sufficiently And what of the claim that the roughly 3400 IIAs now in effect constitute an emerging multilateral 'system'? Even if one assumes, along with Schill, that despite the differences among these treaties (including with respect to ISDS), an international investment regime does exist, why is that regime or system necessarily 'public' and not the hybrid it has always been? Multilateral private law regimes exist after all.
Another alleged distinction between commercial and investment arbitration looks to supposed 71 According to Pauwelyn's data, WTO panelists are more homogeneous in terms of nationality than ICSID arbitrators with the former subject to fewer reappointments, far more likely to be "faceless" bureaucrats appointed by a neutral secretariat; ICSID arbitrators are more likely to come from a closed network (heavily featuring EU/US experience) and likely to involve "star" arbitrators from academe or private practice. ibid.
of ISDS arbitrators can change over time either because of conscious efforts or due to other realities. It seems short-sighted to build a public law jurisprudential frame around such changeable conditions. At the same time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the something like 'I am public arbitrator because I have a preference for precedents'. But if this is the key distinction between commercial arbitration and ISDS, it is important to acknowledge that this, like the nature of arbitrators in ISDS, is a constructed distinction and that not all ISDS arbitrators, parties to IIAs, or writers of amicus agree. 78 Resting the 'publicness' of ISDS on this fact -ISDS is a public regime because many have insisted that it be so-risks circularity.
ISDS is also not novel in its pragmatic reliance on prior adjudicative rulings. national court, permanent international tribunal, or arbitration panel) and whether or not a modern investment protection treaty is in play. 82
VI. The Problematic PUBLIC Prescriptions
But if the ten reasons for describing ISDS as 'public' raise some cautionary flags, these are models of precise thought as compared to the second list of ten common public law prescriptions above. Every one of these purported recipes for action raises more questions than it answers. The contention that investor-state arbitrators need to turn to 'public law analogies' presumes that there is general agreement on what these are but the examples of such analogies cited are contestable. Take the proposition that the state always defrays its own costs even if it prevails, cited by one tribunal as a 'public law principle' drawn from the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. 83 Other ISDS tribunals have applied the loser pays principle instead, drawing from commercial arbitration. 84 If either rule invariably applies in the public law adjudication, evidence for that is scant. 85 In any case, to be consistent with another public law prescription in the second list of ten above, one would expect any investor-state arbitrator relying on the alleged rule that respondent states always pay for their own costs to clearly explain why that rule should apply irrespective of the treaty text at issue, the rights being litigated, or other circumstances. The mere fact that the principle has been applied by some international courts, like the European Court of Human Rights, does not satisfy the public law (or GAL) demand for a well-reasoned opinion. A reasoned explanation for applying the principle would also presumably explain why-inspired by private law inquiries-the applicable default rule should not be whatever rule normally applies in the jurisdiction where the arbitration is taking place, whatever rule is suggested by the relevant arbitration rules, or whatever rule is suggested by application of any relevant conflict of laws principles. As to choosing between ostensibly public or private analogies on this or other issues, one would have thought it would be appropriate to consider whether a particular rule, public or private, would better comply with the legitimate expectations of the litigants in the particular context. 'general principle of proportionality' need to explain which principle they have in mind-the various balancing tests deployed by U.S. courts (from strict scrutiny to rational basis scrutiny), the three tiered 82 See e.g., Norton (n 80). 83 See Roberts 'Clash of Paradigms' (n 4) 47 (citing the Thunderbird case). 84 See e.g., Vadi (n 11) 160 (citing the Europe Cement case) 85 Compare TPP, Investment Chapter (n 76), Art 9.29(3) (permitting the tribunal to determine how and by whom costs for the arbitration and attorney's fees shall be paid in accordance with applicable arbitration rules) and Art 9.29(4) (permitting the tribunal to award the respondent state costs if it deems a claim to be frivolous). 86 -594 (urging a comparative law approach to adopting standards of scrutiny because, despite differences in how the levels of scrutiny are cast, these reflect comparable "separation of powers" concerns). With all due respect, the prospect that diverse states from all over the world share a comparable conception of the principle of "separation of powers", a principle that in the U.S. has resulted in three distinct tiers of constitutional scrutiny, does not seem to be a very likely possibility. 88 See e.g., Alvarez (n 87). 89 See Roberts 'Clash of Paradigms' (n 4) at 55. 90 See Schill 'Deference' (n 87) at 581 (noting how the majority of international decisions have "rightly" rejected the in dubio mitius principle). The proposition that in dubio mitius is a principle that public international lawyers should naturally be inclined to support is akin to the absurd contention that international lawyers must always support whatever position nations happen to favor from time to time. 91 See e.g., Alvarez (n 87) at 208-215. The contention made by this author that the measures not precluded clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT should be read in light of the customary defense of necessity now contained in Art. 25 of the principles of attribution to its remedies for international wrongful acts to its permissible defenses-must apply to the relationship between states and investors, irrespective of the terms, object and purpose, and negotiating history of particular investment treaties.
While there is no question that investment treaties leave many interpretative gaps to be filled, telling arbitrators that they should fill them through 'public law analogies' is akin to telling them to find a rule that suits an outcome that they are otherwise inclined to reach. There is a lively debate concerning, we must do so, not by inapt analogies with private law rules, but from the words of Chapter Eleven, read in the context of the Treaty as a whole, and for the purpose which it sets out to achieve". 96 In this case, in the absence of explicit treaty language directly on point, the arbitrators decided that ISDS was simply a matter of "convenience" and not a remedy with greater substantive import. 97 Right or wrong, this part of the Loewen ruling was consistent with a number of the public law prescriptions above. In so ruling, the Loewen arbitrators applied 'public' customary rules (diplomatic espousal and the specific rule of continuous nationality) as defragmentation tools of systematic integration, shrank the domain of investment claims in deference to sovereignty, and reaffirmed that states The Loewen ruling highlights the internal tensions between some of the ten 'public' prescriptions above. Few would argue that the state parties to the European Convention of Human Rights must be treated as retaining 'control' over their treaty-in the same way that some apparently do with respect to that other 'public' law regime, the NAFTA-and yet that is another public law regime that the public law prescriptions suggest ought to be emulated in the course of ISDS.
As is also suggested by the Loewen example, short-circuiting the examination of treaty texts, object and purpose, context, and negotiating history by reaching to on-the-shelf 'public law' solutions disserves other rules of public law, namely the customary rules of treaty interpretation. 95 Loewen (n 94) para 233. That tribunal noted that the "private lawyer might well exclaim that the uncovenanted benefit to the defendant would produce a result so unjust that it could be sustained only by irrefutable logic or compelling precedent, and neither exists". ibid, para 232. It rejected this contention noting that "[r]ights of action under private law arise from personal obligations (albeit they may be owed by or to a State) brought into existence by domestic law and enforceable through domestic tribunals and courts," whereas NAFTA claims stem "from a corner of public international law" that are "distinct from and exclusive of the remedies for wrongful acts under private law". ibid, para 233. 96 ibid, para 233. 97 See ibid, para 226 (determining that the customary rule requiring continuous nationality applied even though the NAFTA contained no language demanding its application).
the dozens of (mostly) bilateral pairings of states that have concluded BITs over more than 30 years shared a uniform intent: that is, that all investment treaties are mere vehicles for old-fashioned diplomatic espousal and not novel tools to enable host states to get out of the politicized espousal business altogether.
The widely endorsed GAL recipe book for improving the investment regime recommending enhanced transparency, participation, reason-giving, and review is also a contestable product of ISDS's 'publicness'. It is not true that all legitimate public law regimes evince these characteristics. As a number of trade scholars have pointed out, the vast bulk of trade disputes are resolved before a WTO panel is formed-when trade disputes are quietly settled without either transparency or participation by third parties (or even assurance that the underlying rules of the trade regime are being faithfully applied).
Despite the sharp turn to legalization after the Uruguay Round, the WTO adheres to a 'club' model for signed dissents and concurring opinions? If, as many suggest, signed individualized opinions enhance the amount and quantity of reason-giving, does it mean it ought to be favored for all public adjudicators? Or is it possible that enhanced reason-giving may sometimes need to be counter-balanced by other desirable qualities-such as the need to adhere to canons of interpretation that facilitate judicial minimalism (another quality favored by the public prescriptions above)? Similarly, the GAL insistence on processes for appeal or review says nothing about counterweighing factors that might lead designers of international dispute mechanisms (including ICSID) to favor a single forum subject only to annulment, or why the most highly visible international court of all, the ICJ, seems legitimate without a process for appeal.
Moreover, even if one accepts the GAL premise that transparency, participation, reason-giving, and review are generally desirable features of international inter-state adjudication, these generic recommendations have limited value, particularly if they assume that these accountability methods will coalesce around an agreed 'formula'. As states develop ever more refined investment treaties containing increasingly detailed provisions for ISDS, 101 the real questions are how much transparency and when, whether to build in less transparent, less participatory methods to permit quiet settlements in the shadow of litigation, which kinds of amicus briefs or levels of third participation are appropriate with respect to particular matters or involving states with distinct traditions on these matters, or how much reason-giving to expect to avoid ICSID annulment or denial of enforcement under the New York Convention. The GAL formula for reform does not tell us whether, given all of the novel features that may be in a particular BIT or FTA (including provisions for dismissing frivolous claims, opportunities for the parties to comment on a first draft of an arbitral ruling, or clauses permitting the consolidation of claims), it is worth the added cost and time of building atop that particular treaty some kind of appellate review. 102 And even assuming that formal appellate review in a particular BIT or FTA is both desirable and practicable, other questions loom large: how should that review be structured, does it permit entirely de novo reviews of both fact and law, does the review need to be done by a permanent body, and how should any such review be tailored to existing mechanisms (such as ICSID annulment or anticipated national enforcement proceedings, as under UNCITRAL). These important questions are not (nor should be) amenable to uniform 'public law' responses.
Finally, the contention that GAL or 'public law' yields ready recipes for those seeking to reform their international investment treaties or ISDS is misleading and condescending. It presumes, first, that any and all efforts to re-calibrate investment agreements fall on the 'public law' side of the ledger or that the re-balancing of IIAs makes resolving investor-state disputes more 'public'. 103 Efforts to narrow 101 See e.g., the TPP's Investment Chapter's provisions for ISDS (n 76) Arts 9.18-9.30. 102 possible that some states still concluding relatively old-fashioned BITs are simply ignorant about the public values that they are threatening, it is also possible that some of these are doing so because, given the economic constraints that they face or reputational concerns that they believe that they need to overcome, this is the best way to attract FDI. 108 It seems presumptuous to argue that these states (or in cases of democracies, the peoples' representatives) are wrong if they determine that the public interest demands that they prioritize increased capital flows over making sure that all ISDS awards are public, amicus briefs are always accepted, and all arbitral awards are thoroughly reasoned and appealable exemplars worthy of being included in investment law textbooks. There may be, in short, good reasons for some financially strapped countries to opt for assuring foreign investors that their rights will be respected and if needed enforced through expeditious arbitration. It is also important to recognize that despite the widespread re-calibration of IIAs, even those re-balanced agreements continue to be motivated by the need to provide investment protection, rely on hybrid ISDS, and avoid changes that would enable states to initiate treaty claims against investors. With rare exception states have not turned to an international investment court as an alternative to ISDS and they have avoided turning ISDS into allpurpose venues for hearing all forms of 'public' disputes brought by states against investors. Despite the touted sovereign backlash against it, ISDS (and its hybridity) retains the support of most states.
The different ways that states continue to participate in the spaghetti bowl of IIAs correspond to
competing versions of what the international rule of law demands. 109 Those who argue that a state that continues to permit foreign investors to reach for the less transparent ICC or Stockholm arbitration rules is in violation of the international rule of law would appear to be subscribing to a particularly crimped version of it. It is also puzzling that many of those advocating for these public prescriptions in order to enhance the 'rule of law' endorse both GAL values and interpretative principles that defer to the state.
Given the sad history of state abuse of power and of ineffectual international legal efforts to limit that abuse, it is paradoxical to suggest that public international lawyers should be, for purposes of ISDS, on the side of an interpretative principle like in dubio mitius or one that favors turning to national administrative law notwithstanding the established public international law principle that internal law needs to give way 112 See e.g., Benvenisti (n 60) 232-239 (suggesting that less deference is owed to a state when the rights of foreigners or minorities are at stake). See also Schill 'Deference' (n 87) 14-16 (recognizing differences among international tribunals and rejecting "a one-to-one transposition of standards of review" among them). But see Schill's claim that since ISDS disputes "are mainly concerned with resolving what are in essence public law disputes," investor-state arbitrators need to turn to public law for general principles of state deference that are antithetical to commercial arbitrators who operate under the doctrine of equality of arms. ibid 10-12. The contractual disputes often involved in both ISDS and commercial arbitrations may both involve defenses by a state that its law (emergency law or other) permitted its breach. Such a defense does not (or need not) fundamentally transform those disputes into 'public' ones. In both instances, it may appropriate to defer to the respondent state. In either instance, a commercial or an investor-state arbitrator may find it necessary to defer to the state's existing laws, particularly if there is some indication in the contract that it is governed by national law. Indeed, when that it the case, even an ISDS arbitrator may be better off relying on such a rationale rather than relying on some tenuous general principle concerning the appropriate level of deference to state authority. be filing a dissent at the end of day. And yet, as commentators (including Roberts) have noted, the interpretation of IIAs incorporates features of both the agency and trusteeship models; while ISDS arbitrators or at least the presidents of arbitral tribunals are expected to act as impartial trustees, the interpretation of IIAs also rests on the actions (and possible inter-state interpretations) of their state parties and when that occurs arbitrators have no choice but to render decisions that reflect the views of those state parties. 116 The interpretation of IIAs, in other words, is a "hybrid of agency and trusteeship models". 117 Ignoring this hybridity by opting for an agency model of ISDS ignores reality.
The suggestion that the relevant rules for treaty interpretation, and specifically Article 31(3)(c) of the VCT, license investor-state arbitrations to reach for other public international legal regimes, such as trade or human rights, in interpreting a BIT or FTA is not particularly useful. As Roberts suggests, the real question is how to deploy the malleable rules of interpretation, including that ostensible rule of 'systemic integration.' Many interpretative debates concern which boundary crossings among international legal regimes are appropriate for investor-state arbitrators to make and in what contexts. 118 As Article 31(3)(c) puts it, the question is which rules are truly "relevant" among the parties. The real question is often which public international law regime should govern or which part of it, not whether the investment regime itself or the one from which guidance is sought is more or less 'public' or 'private.' That both the trade and investment regimes are 'public' tells us nothing about whether, for example, national treatment "in like circumstances" (as some BITs provide) should mean the same thing as "like product" (as in the WTO) or whether the 'measures not precluded' clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT means the same thing as Article XX of the GATT. 119 The remedial and other structural differences among the investment, trade, and human rights regimes need to be taken into account when one tries to extrapolate law from one regime to the others. 120 (Indeed, it is striking how few IIAs actually incorporate, without significant change and in full, the language of GATT's public policy exceptions in its Article XX.) 121 Given the differences in treaty text and regime intent and context, 'horizontal boundary crossings' need to be undertaken with the same caution one would apply when attempting to export a principle of national law to the international context. While all can agree that no international law regime is in principle 'self-contained,' that does not mean even similarly stated rights can be ripped from their institutional context and applied to another regime. That another international law regime is 'public' tells us little about whether borrowing its law for application in ISDS is appropriate.
Consider the widely praised Methanex decision under the NAFTA. 122 That tribunal rejected a multi-million-dollar claim by the world's largest producer of methanol, a key ingredient in MTBE, a gasoline additive that had been banned by California because of the threat it posed to drinking water. An important element of Methanex's claim was that the California measures discriminated against it in favor of locally produced ethanol. 123 Methanex and its experts relied for this argument on WTO rulings that had found violations of national treatment based on unequal treatment of 'like products' in the sense of products that compete for the same customers. 124 Methanex argued that methanol producers were in like circumstances with U.S. domestic ethanol producers because they both produce oxygenates used in manufacturing reformulated gasoline and because they both compete for customers in the oxygenate market. 125 Methanex also relied on WTO law with respect to Article XX of the GATT; it contended that once it had shown that it had suffered from less favorable treatment, the burden was on the United States to prove the four elements of proof that WTO panels required under Article XX. 126 It sought to convince the NAFTA tribunal to turn to WTO caselaw to require the United States to prove that California's measures were necessary to fulfill an environmental objective, were proportionate, were the least restrictive possible, and did not constitute a disguised restriction on trade in a like product. 127 Among the reasons for rejecting Methanex's claims was the NAFTA's tribunal's finding that the NAFTA's national treatment guarantee could not be reduced to an inquiry about whether a foreign investor produces a directly substitutable good as determined by the end use made of the product by consumers. 128 In distinguishing WTO law, the tribunal praised the "carefully reasoned Amicus submission" filed by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) in that case. 129 The tribunal also appeared to rely on that amicus in rejecting Methanex's attempt to draw from Article XX of the GATT and the relevant trade caselaw interpreting it. While that amicus brief relied on trade law for a number of other contentions, it stressed the significance of the NAFTA's failure to include a provision comparable to Article XX. 130 For the amicus, as for the tribunal, it was inappropriate to import Article XX's caselaw and accordingly, Methanex's contentions as to what the U.S. needed to prove as respondent were rejected. Instead, the tribunal appeared to find that the United States could rely on a general residual right to regulate given the product. The U.S. was not expected to prove a particular legitimate regulatory purpose, had leeway to define what constituted 'like circumstance', and did not have to prove that it pursued the least restrictive alternative. 131 One of the reasons that the Methanex arbitrators reached the right 'progressive' result was, in short, because, unlike at least one investor-state tribunal, they were wise enough not to simply export, irrespective of context, WTO jurisprudence on national treatment (or 'likeness') or GATT Article XX when neither the facts of that case nor the text of the investment treaty in question justified it. 132 132 See e.g., Howse and Chalamish (n 122) at 1090 (agreeing that "[n]orms apparently common both to investor protection law and the multi-lateral trading system, such as National Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation, are understood in a different contextual and textual space when used in the investment law regime."). See also Alvarez one thinks that the Methanex tribunal misread or misapplied trade law (as with respect to whether the relevant products in that case were in direct competition), the larger lesson provided by that ruling is that an 'environmentally friendly' result does not require borrowing 'public law' developed in another international regime. The Methanex ruling also suggests that while WTO jurisprudence has often been deployed in the ISDS context, the use of trade law (or other 'public law') analogies need to be explained and grounded in the texts, purposes, and histories of the treaties at issue. 133 The Methanex case illustrates that those looking for guidance on the increasingly nuanced interpretative questions faced by ISDS tribunals will not be satisfied by the crude public law prescriptions contained in the second list above. A general recommendation to 'apply public law liberally' is not a wise, practical, or viable recipe for legitimate investment law interpretation, and it is not the only way to reach a result that is appropriately respectful of 'sovereign policy space'.
The contention that the public nature of ISDS should prompt a search for and application of 'general principles of public law' drawn from national laws and practices merits critical scrutiny as well.
ISDS tribunals have, of course, a license to apply general principles of law to the extent these are, for example, "relevant rules of international law" under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 134 For public law advocates, general principles of public law are obviously relevant to the public international investment regime and are particularly desirable insofar as their use will promote less international law fragmentation between public law regimes. Thus, Schill argues that "general principles of public law" can and should influence the interpretation of investment treaties as well as the interpretation of any relevant rules of customary law insofar as these principles permit deducing "institutional and procedural requirements from comparable domestic and international standards for a context-specific interpretation of the investor's right in question." 135 Schill has argued that such general principles of public law can assist ISDS tribunals in terms of determining liability for representations made by government officials, for taxes they impose on property, or for resolving tensions between the right to property and a government's duty to protect cultural heritage, for example. 136 Schill's examples imply a considerable expansion of this third source in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. As explained by, for example, Oscar Schachter, general principles of law have been based on different sources or rationales. For some, these principles are found and are based on legal norms in the municipal legal orders of "civilized" nations that would be appropriate to apply to inter-state relations; for others, these principles are "derived from the specific nature of the international community", while yet other scholars have sought to find concepts "intrinsic to the idea of law" or the rule of law. 137 between those governmental representations to private parties that can be renounced without liability and those that generate compensable legitimate expectations cannot be readily discerned. Agreement with respect to how the property interests of foreigners should be respected continues to elude states. Today's spaghetti soup of over 3400 bilateral and regional investment treaties, built on the wreckage of prior attempts to secure multilateral agreement on the protection of property, is the result of the fact that the national public laws regarding property rights are notoriously context-dependent and driven by cultural and other social values. 144 Indeed, some have questioned the viability of a general human right to property on precisely such grounds. 145 Even within the states of Europe-whose shared values have enabled them to agree on the common set of human rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rightsthat treaty's right to "possessions" is subject to vague qualifications that reflect the differences in how
European states address the balance struck between the right to property and sovereigns' right to regulate. 146 The same, it has been suggested, holds true even with respect to the United States and Canada, despite those nations' historical and cultural affinities and ties. Indeed, the allegedly distinct ways those two countries have answered some of the questions that Schill expects general principles to answer (see text at note 136 above) has produced enduring critiques of the NAFTA's investment chapter, and particularly its application to regulatory takings. 147 If differences exist as between Canada and the United
States on such issues, the prospects of finding general public law principles to resolve such matters among the one hundred and eighty states that are parties to at least one IIA or (the 161 that are parties to the ICSID Convention), which include a great deal of variance with respect to the relationship between state and market, would appear to be scant indeed.
Given these realities, the texts of IIAs, with rare exception, do not authorize a renvoi to national law in terms of the substantive protections accorded to foreign investors. In lieu of turning to national law for this purpose, the drafters of IIAs turned to autonomous treaty obligations-from national treatment to FET to the international minimum standard. They understood that such rights, like all international legal obligations, would apply irrespective of internal law. 148 Presumably, those urging resort to general principles of public law in the interpretation of these treaty guarantees would not disagree with these basic precepts. Presumably, they are also aware that other international courts that are required to apply autonomous treaty rights or standards, such as the European Court of Human Rights which is required to protect the right to possessions, have also endeavored to interpret these as having a separate or distinct meaning independent from domestic law. 149 Of course, as students of property rights know, even national courts charged with enforcing constitutional rights to compensation for governmental takings-guarantees which undoubtedly inspired the takings guarantees in many IIAs-have long been aware of the need to avoid the "positivist trap", namely the error of turning to national legislation to define the limits of constitutional safeguards from abusive government action, including legislation. 150 As is well known as well, resort to general standards of treatment-like FET, the international minimum standard, full protection and security, and the need for prompt, adequate and effective compensation for government takings-and to international arbitration to enforce these, were specifically directed at those, like Carlos Calvo, who had argued that international law required foreign investors only to be treated like national investors and, like them, only have recourse to national remedies.
But even assuming that the prescription to apply general principles of public law does not intend to challenge these fundamental tenets of most IIAs, adjudicative efforts to apply general principles of law provide other reasons to be skeptical about this proposed remedy for producing more coherent (and more legitimate) international investment law. As Neha Jain has demonstrated, international criminal judges' attempts to draw on general principles of law are problematic. 151 As she indicates, the competing conceptions of general principles of law explain some of the difficulties. 152 Given extensive debates about the meaning of the rule of law or the 'nature' of the international legal system, one can hardly expect agreement on useful general principles that go significantly beyond a small set of rules to promote equitable results. 153 As even proponents of deeper engagement with general principles of law acknowledge, the techniques for finding genuinely general general principles require sophisticated engagement with comparative law techniques, not amateur comparativism. 154 As this example suggests, those who propose resort to general principles of public law, on the assumption that these will further governments' regulatory space to protect the public interest or lessen the discretion accorded to ISDS arbitrators may be disappointed. But see Vadi (n 11) at 137-174 (discussing the many forms of "micro-comparisons" to other legal systems being made by ISDS arbitrators and praising these, at 174, as tools for "preventing arbitral law-making"). 158 Such a risk would appear to be especially great if, as Pauwelyn suggests (n 70), the world of ISDS arbitrators is dominated by prominent repeat arbitrators from Europe and the United States. 159 See e.g., Jain (n 138) 134-137; Vadi (n 11) 163. 160 See e.g., Jain (n 138) 134-137.
on sensitive matters regarding property rights protections, to develop laws and practices that do not replicate those of their colonial rulers. Post-colonial states, particularly but not only those who achieved their full independence after some revolutionary turmoil, are likely to have re-examined the balances between private property rights and the rights of states to regulate in the public interest that they inherited from their former colonial masters.
The difficulties of uncovering applicable general principles of public law become all the more manifest when we consider options within the legal families approach. As Jain indicates, the options here include Rene David's four families (Romano-Germanic, Socialist, common law, and a residual 'other'
category that apparently includes everything from Hindu to Muslim) and Zwergert and Kötz's eight (Romanic, Germanic, Nordic, Common law, socialist, far eastern, Islamic, Hindu). 161 As she indicates, the legal families formula for discovering general principles paints with a broad brush, errs on the side of 'macro-comparisons' between legal systems in lieu of 'micro-comparisons' on specific legal issues or institutions, and ignores rival ways of distinguishing among legal systems. 162 It also tends to make the comparative law search for universal standards manageable by ignoring the institutional context in which the law lives and breathes. 163 Critics of such approaches, such as Pierre Legrand and Radolfo Sacco, among others, have noted the need to be exceptionally cautious about extracting rules without attention to such context. 164 Those who aspire to find general principles of public law need to acknowledge that this is a difficult exercise involving three formidable steps: accurate identification of the legal rule in local context, accurately abstracting the legal general principle on which that rule is based, and accurately transporting it to the international plane where it can be properly considered in the course of interpreting a particular BIT or FTA (given its particular text, context, and negotiating history). 165 Given the difficulties and the prospects for accusations of bias, investor-state arbitrators, particularly those willing to engage in sophisticated comparativism, are likely to continue to find relatively few general public law principles that they can use to address the specific property rights issues that Schill identifies. That source of law is likely to remain the narrow gap-filler to achieve equity and avoid findings of non liquet that it now is. Careless comparativism, on the other hand, in which alleged general principles of property rights protections are found to displace investment treaty guarantees, could become a politically charged route for a de facto (and unauthorized) 165 See e.g., ibid 139-142 (discussing the challenges involved in transplanting municipal concepts to the international level). 166 Compare ibid 150 (coming to comparable conclusions with respect to international criminal judges). See also ibid 74 (noting that analogical or comparative reasoning that fails to comply with international law "may contribute to the 'legitimacy crisis' of investment treaty arbitration").
VII. Ten Lessons
It is appropriate that an essay that begins with two lists purporting to describe ISDS and to prescribe reforms for it going forward, should draw its own list of ten cautionary lessons from those preceding lists. 6. Public law prescriptions may not always produce the 'progressive' results their proponents intend.
Generic recommendations to enhance 'transparency' and 'participation' may deter efforts to quietly settle disputes before they become contentious. General recommendations to defer to the preferences of states fail to consider: differences between the actions of different parts of a government (state/federal/executive/legislative/judicial), that internal law is not an excuse from an international legal obligation, or that much of international law is designed to prevent the abuse of sovereign authority. Recommendations to borrow from other public law regimes on the assumption that mutual 'publicness' ensures deference to sovereigns may be erroneous. ISDS rulings that, for example, rely on the GATT's Article XX when no such provision appears in a BIT or FTA may force respondent states to attempt to fit their regulatory purposes within those enumerated in Article XX, to conform their defenses to evolving trade caselaw, and to satisfy the trade regime's burdens of proof. ISDS respondent states may enjoy greater policy discretion if they can rely instead on a flexible and general residual right to regulate. 174 7. The claim that the investment regime or ISDS is 'public' is not equivalent to the proposition that either or both are governed by public international law. 175 No one doubts that ISDS is the product of treaty or that unless a specific BIT or FTA were to indicate otherwise, investor-state arbitrators are charged with interpreting these agreements in accord with the VCLT. There is also no doubt that as a regime governed by public international law, the international investment regime shares many common challenges and points of intersection with other public international legal regimes. 176 But the first list of descriptions and the second list of public law prescriptions at the beginning of this essay do not invariably follow from the proposition that the investment regime is governed by public international law. International lawyers would have some trouble identifying sources of public international law that would support the first descriptive list. Public international law sources, particularly the faithful application of the customary rules of treaty interpretation, would also be at odds with at least some of the public law prescriptions contained in the second.
8. Contentions based on the 'publicness' of the investment regime or ISDS often take the form that both are (or should be) solely 'public'. The hybridity of the regime or of ISDS is, from this perspective, something to be ignored or changed. Thus, Schill argues for the relevancy of general principles of public law; he does not address whether it is ever appropriate to apply any principles of private law or what happens when the two types of general principles conflict. 177 Similarly, the German school of public law scholars supports their recommendations for regime change on the basis that the investment regime is a scheme for 'public' governance. 178 They do not consider whether it is relevant to consider, for example, those aspects of the investment regime or ISDS that appear to rely on 'private' or market-based actors, as appears to be the case with respect to the imperfect scheme for enforcing ISDS awards. For public law scholars generally, the power of the most prominent private actors of ISDS, investor claimants-in choosing which claims to bring, which legal arguments to make, which arbitral mechanism to trigger, and which party appointed arbitrator to choose-are harms that need to be counter-balanced by enhancing the power of states in conjunction with elements of civil society. For at least some of these scholars, ISDS's reliance on private claimants is a problem that needs to be resolved; that is, it is an indication that it is a 'wrongly privatized' scheme for the resolution of public disputes that should be resolved by public institutions-by turning to national courts, state-to-state arbitration, or a permanent international investment court (or some combination of the three). The contention that the role of such private actors or other private 'enforcers' of ISDS is a fundamental attribute that may account for the regime's relative successes escapes notice or is seen as profoundly misguided.
9. Public law scholars focus on the public forms of global governance. And yet governance has historically been produced as well by private actors, from the Dutch East India Company to United Fruit to today's powerful multinational corporations, whether acting alone or in association with governments. 179 'Governance' does not exist only on the 'public' side. The rigid public/private divide encouraged by the two lists at the start of this essay makes it more difficult to perceive the ways that the investment regime and ISDS, like many other mechanisms of global law, straddles the governance divide. 180 The work of a number of scholars, such as Fabrizio Cafaggi, by contrast, indicates how much regulatory work is now being performed by transnational private rule making bodies. 181 Moreover, the goals of ostensibly 'private' forms of governance have never been divorced from those pursued by governments. States have used their contracts with private parties to implement their public policies, for example, and both private and hybrid forms of standard setting regulate externalities such as environmental harms, product safety, and human rights violations that occur within today's global value chains. 182 The very conception of what 'property' entitled to protection is seeks to determine not only the proper sphere of governmental activity (that is, the extent to which government can interfere with private property rights) but also the right property owners have to exclude other private partiesthe sphere covered by 'private law.' 183 Similarly, scholars have addressed how other forms of private international law, including national law on jurisdiction, conflict of laws, and recognition and enforcement of judgments or arbitral awards, are also forms of regulation and have a deep impact on property rights and whether these are enforced. 184 The goals of these forms of ordering-public or private-are not entirely distinct: both seek to decrease the risks of opportunistic behavior. If a fundamental goal of public law scholars is to restore or safeguard only governments' right to interfere with private rights to property, that normative agenda needs to be made clear and justified. In the meantime, they should not ignore how much governance now occurs by private or hybrid means, and how much the very notion of property owes to both.
10. Public law descriptions and prescriptions tend to presume a linear narrative. Optimistic public law scholars, like Schill, see the regime as another one of public international law's familiar progress narratives. In this vision once the publicness of the investment regime and ISDS is accepted and taken seriously and public law prescriptions are adopted, the regime's legitimacy deficits will recede. For some public law scholars the long term viability of ISDS will be secured only when a fully 'public' and multilateral regime for investment law, ideally accompanied by a permanent dispute settlement system on the model of the WTO's, is secured. 185 In the meantime, avowedly 'public law prescriptions' as in the CETA (with its international investment court) are seen as incremental steps towards the eventual public-ification (along with formal multilaterialization) of the regime. 186 Other public law scholars predict (or even eagerly await) the demise of ISDS because the contemplated public law reforms to it will prove to be too little too late to alter its fundamentally compromised nature. 187 These accounts of ISDS's past and future ignore the possibility that today's investment regime is best approached not as a linear narrative leading to either its eventual successful public-ification or deserved demise, but, like much else in international law, as the product of recursive interactions (or forms of 'contestations' and 'deference') between states and other actors, including business interests. 188 From a more political perspective, it may be that international investment law, like the regulatory welfare state generally, is the product of a historical dialectic. Karl Polanyi may well have been right when he argued in
The Great Transformation that periods of utopian market liberalism tend to be followed by counter-movements in favor of greater government regulation. 189 David Garland has seen a comparable dialectic operating with respect to the history of regulatory models of the welfare state. 190 Given the apparent scholarly consensus surrounding the two lists at the start of this essay, it is quite likely that there will be resistance to at least some of the ten lessons in Part VII, including some of those summarized in the paragraph above. Some of the controversy may reflect different views of the object and purpose of ISDS and the international investment regime. The public account of the investment regime tends to see it as the product of a struggle between the necessary evil of foreign investors and regulators striving to take back their capacity to protect the public interest from the negative externalities posed by foreign investment. It seeks to make investor-state arbitrators enablers of the state.
The existing hybrid investment regime responds, to be sure, to that dynamic, but it also consists of many IIAs that recognize, as does the U.S. Constitution's Taking Clause, that some private property rights are entitled to international protection from the power of states and cannot simply be gutted by the public 189 power of governments. This essay assumes that, consistent with the rules of treaty interpretation, investor-state arbitrators should strive to achieve these hybrid objectives.
So, is ISDS 'public'? Too often the answer has been that it is exclusively public. The answer to the titular question presented here is more nuanced: Since it is not clear what we mean by 'public', and that description threatens to be circular and produce problematic prescriptions, ISDS is more accurately described as a 'hybrid'.
